This article builds on Gadamer's rehabilitation of the Augustinian concept of inner word (verbum in corde). Unlike most interpretions, the thesis is that the Augustinian inner word does not show the potentialities, but rather the ineffectiveness of ontological hermeneutics. In the first section, it is argued that for the later Augustine the verbum in corde is the consequence of a Word-and Truth-event. In the second section, the author suggests that Gadamer has properly understood the verbum in corde as a matter of faith. In the third section, it is shown that Gadamer has found in the notion a paradigm for his philosophical and theological insights.
Introduction
This article builds on the chapter Sprache und verbum of Wahrheit und Methode, in which Gadamer rehabilitates the notion of 'inner word', and opposes it to the 'forgetfulness of language (Sprachvergessenheit)' that Plato would have inaugurated with the Cratylus. My hypothesis, as Jean Grondin and other scholars have already stated, is that the rehabilitation of 1 2 the notion of 'inner word' can be seen as a paradigm for all hermeneutics aiming at truth and universality. Together with the most part of interpreters, moreover, I share both the idea that, despite vague references, Augustine of Hippo is at the core of Gadamer's reflections, and the 3 idea that the verbum in corde (word in the heart) is a privileged point of view to test the whole of ontological hermeneutics' tradition.
However, contrary to Grondin and most interpretations, my thesis is that the Augustinian inner word does not show the potentialities, but rather the ineffectiveness of this tradition. In
Gadamer's perspective, the verbum in corde is the consequence of a 'hermeneutical experience', and this is defined as a radically disorientating truth-and word-event: 'Strictly speaking', Gadamer says, 'we cannot have the same [hermeneutical] experience twice. It is true, of
course, that part of the nature of experience is to be continually confirmed […] . But it is no longer a [hermeneutical] experience when it is repeated and confirmed.' The hermeneutical 4 experience, than, has not much to do with Aristotle's εµπειρία, nor with Hegel's Erfahrung.
According to the former, the universality of the concept is ontologically prior and what concerns him about experience is merely how it contributes to the formation of the concept. According to the latter, experience has the structure of a reversal of consciousness but, in the end, for Hegel, conscious experience should lead to a self-knowledge that no longer has anything other or alien to itself. Rather, the hermeneutical experience is represented by the Aeschylus' formula 'learning through suffering (πάθει µάθος/ durch Leiden lernen).' For the German philosopher, this phrase does not only mean that we become wise through suffering.
Aeschylus means more than this: 'He refers to the reason why this is so. What a man has to learn through suffering is not this or that particular thing, but insight into the limitations of
humanity, into the absoluteness of the barrier that separates man from the divine. It is ultimately a religious insight […].' 5
Hence, the notion of verbum in corde, both for Augustine and Gadamer, does not concern the philosophical explication of the linguistic and semantic structure of the human mind. This is the case, instead, of a long and almost parallel tradition that goes from Aristotle to J. Fodor.
Isabelle Koch's recent interpretation of Augustine's inner word is inadequate, insofar it excludes the 'project of the intellectus fidei', to which, as she admits, 'all psychological and cognitive analysis of the De Trinitate conform.' Moreover, the notion of verbum in corde has 6 not much to do with the onto(theo)logical analogy of proportion between the Word in God and the incarnate Word on the one hand, and the inner and outer word in men on the other.
Several Greek and Latin Church fathers have used the classical Stoic distinction between
λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and προφορικός in this way. Rather, according to a tradition that stretches from Paul to the Dialectical Theology of Karl Barth passing through Luther, the verbum in 7 corde, as thought by the late Augustine and rehabilitated by Gadamer, must be understood as a genuine theological concept. More precisely, the verbum in corde is the consequence of the donum dei, the gratuitous intervention of the grace on men, which is the sole source of good human words and actions. A certain affinity between ontological hermeneutics and Protestant theology in the twentieth century is attested among the scholars. The mutual influence be- Between Book X and XIV, Augustine presents three trinities in the human mind, which reflect with different degrees of perfection the Holy Trinity. These trinities are similar to the three genres of verbum in corde I am describing in this paragraph. In Book XI, a human trinity is presented, made of (1) the perceived body, (2) its impression in the gaze of the perceiving person and (3) the attention of the will, which connects the former to the latter. 25 This first trinity, still exterior, is replaced with a second trinity in man made of (1) the image of the perceived body in memory, (2) the form that reproduces such an image when the gaze of the subject is oriented to it, and (3) the attention of the will, which once again connects the former to the latter. The superiority of this trinity compared to the first one is evi 26 -dent, since 'in these three there is no longer any diversity of substance. For neither is the sensible body there, which is altogether distinct from the nature of the living being, nor is the bodily sense there informed so as to produce vision, nor does the will itself perform its office of applying the sense, that is to be informed, to the sensible body, and of retaining it in it when informed.' Nevertheless, even this trinity, through memory contents, maintains a cer 27 -tain link with exteriority. Then, in Book XII, Augustine presents a human trinity, which is completely detached from exteriority, oriented toward the eternal reasons: 'But it is the part of the higher reason to judge these corporeal things according to incorporeal and eternal reasons;
[…] But we judge corporeal things from the rule of dimensions and figures, which the mind knows to remain unchangeably.' This third trinity, however, cannot be considered the best 28 image in man of the Holy Trinity since, as Augustine says in Book XV recapitulating the previous analysis, human knowledge is inferior to the wisdom of man, 'which is granted him by God's gift in the partaking of the very God Himself.'
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In Book XV, the bishop of Hippo returns to speak about the verbum in corde:
Whoever, then, is able to understand a word, not only before it is uttered in sound, but also before the images of its sounds are considered in thought […] whoever, I say, is able to understand this [word] , is able now to see through this mirror and in this enigma some likeness of that Word of whom it is said, In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. 30 The two terms 'mirror (spaeculum)' and 'enigma (aenigma)' refer to the First Epistle to the Corinthians (13, 12) : 'For now we see in a mirror (per spaeculum), in an enigma (in aenigmitate), but then face to face. Now I know in part, but then I will know fully, even as I was also fully known.' To explain these terms, Augustine uses the expression 'obscura allegoria (ob- hand, he says, in Augustine's theology of the Word, the language's devaluation that Gadamer refuses is present. On the other hand, however, for Augustine, human will has a central role in the generation of the word (generatio verbi), and this activity is similar to the evenemential character that Gadamer attributes to the language. 43 It is true that in several passages of the paragraph Sprache und verbum, Gadamer, reflecting on the Augustinian verbum in corde, seems to be concerned with the national and spoken ! 8 languages, as when he writes that 'the external word and with it the whole problem of the variety of languages, was explicitly devalued by Augustine, though he still discusses it.' 44 Nevertheless, the German philosopher is aware that for Augustine 'the fact that the verbum is spoken differently in different languages (Sprache), however, means only that it cannot reveal itself through the human tongue (Zunge) in its true being.' Similarly, in an interview 45 given to Jean Grondin in 1996, Gadamer confirms that 'the multiplicity of languages must not represent an insurmountable barrier for hermeneutics, since all languages can be learned.' 46 The notion of verbum in corde does not concern the multiplicity of human languages, but rather the 'infinite task', which 'lies in the experience of the limit of the word as such.' It is true, here too, that in several passages of the paragraph Sprache und verbum, Gadamer seems concerned with the analogy of proportion, as when he says that 'exegesis interprets the speaking of the word to be as miraculous as the incarnation (Fleischwerden) of God.' Nev 51 -ertheless, few lines below the German philosopher points out that:
The great miracle of language lies not in the fact that the Word becomes flesh and emerges in external being, but that that which emerges and externalizes itself in utterance is always already a word. That the Word is with God from all eternity is the victorious doctrine of the church in its defense against subordinationism, and it situates the problem of language, too, entirely within inner thought. 52 In other words, the mystery of Trinity is mirrored in the language insofar the word is nothing by itself, and does not seek to be anything: it has its being in its revealing. 'Exactly the same thing, Gadamer says, is true of the mystery of the Trinity. used some important dogmatic notions for its philosophical purposes. In my opinion, by contrast, when Gadamer treats the verbum in corde, he is consciously assuming a position which is closed to the early dialectical theology of the protestant theologian Karl Barth and to its Pauline and Lutheran sources. In these theological reflections, the German philosopher has found a mirror of his philosophical hermeneutics, which can be considered the result of a short circuit between the existential and hermeneutical approach of the 'first', and the evenemential and anti-hermeneutical thought of the 'second' Heidegger. Notoriously, the late Heidegger gives up with hermeneutics in the proper sense. In Unterwegs zur Sprache, in the dialogue between a Japanese and an Inquirer, he still uses the term, but he states that 'hermeneutics means not just the interpretation but, even before it, the bearing of message and tidings.' 65 The language is not much a dialogue, but rather a silent listening of Being: 'But language is monologue. This now says two things: it is language alone which speaks authentically; and, language speaks lonesomely.' 66 Heidegger seems aware of the radical incompatibility between his early and his late brief statement is important, however, for at least three reasons. Schleiermacher has privileged the technical and psychological dimension of hermeneutics.
Hence, he has exalted the subjective dimension of interpretation, i.e. the intentions of the author, to the expense of the claim for truth of the text -the thing of the text. However, Schleiermacher did not accomplish the technicist and psychologist orientation of the historical school and the romantic hermeneutics. His hermeneutics is still oriented toward the dogmatic interest for specific texts: 'his hermeneutical theory was still a long way from a historiology that could serve as a methodological organon for the human sciences. Its goal was the exact understanding of particular texts.' This is, after all, the intrinsic paradox of the entire liberal 79 theology's tradition. On the one hand, it aims to display the universal character of the proclamation. On the other hand, however, it remains within the specific proclamation of Jesus Christ. Liberal theology, then, cannot realize its proper claim for universality. Gadamer's critics to the Schleiermacherian hermeneutics can be understood as a consequence of the critics to the self-consciousness of faith, which is, according to him, the dogmatically dangerous ba- Bultmann does not see that such a pre-comprehension is not the result of a scientific process of interpretation, but rather is 'presupposed as already given'. The prerequisite, which is opened to interpretation, consists of being touched by the problem of God. And such a prerequisite is not given by the simple fact of being a man, as liberal theology explicitly suggests, and Bultmann's demythologization implicitly admits; rather, Gadamer affirms, 'it is first from God -i.e. from faith.' Only the grace of God, which is a truth event, opens for the 87 German philosopher the space for genuine interpretation.
The Catholic Church, with its predilection for the works, would not have understood, according to Gadamer, this principle of ontological hermeneutics. Bultmann, in his turn, has forgotten that the demythologization is already enclosed in this first prerequisite, exactly as In conclusion, I can say that the Gadamerian use of the Augustinian verbum in corde,
properly understood as the consequence of the Word-and Truth-event of God on men, is the consequence of such a radical notion of grace, which is, in its turn, the adequate paradigm of the anti-methodological and anti-liberal ontological hermeneutics of Gadamer.
Conclusion
In the first section, I have demonstrated that the Augustinian notion of verbum in corde is an innovation with regards to both the 'Greek' and the 'Biblical' tradition. The bishop of Hippo is not asmuch interested into the linguistic structure of the human mind, nor in the relation between the inner and outer word, and its similitude with the Word of God. Rather, Augustine is concerned with the efficacy of the Word of God on men: the verbum in corde is the consequence of a Word-and Truth-event. If there is a partial rehabilitation of exteriority, as some interpreters have suggested, this is just a consequence of this more radical statement. In the second section, I have demonstrated that, through his rehabilitation, Gadamer did not misunderstand, nor accomplish Augustine's intentions. Rather, the German philosopher has properly understood the Augustinian notion of verbum in corde as a matter of faith, i.e. the consequence of a gift that cannot be returned. In his perspective, the importance of the notion 89 does not much reside in the rehabilitation of the spoken and national languages. More profoundly, the verbum in corde concerns the unique Word, which is behind -and supports -all genuine words. In the third section, I have suggested that Gadamer finds in the Augustinian notion a paradigm for both its philosophical and theological insights. Concerning the former, the German philosopher, although defending the dialogicity of language, has always been fascinated by the evenemential character of the late Heidegger's thought. Concerning the latter, he has explicitly accused Bultmann's demythologization of being 'human, all too human', and he has implicitly praised Barth's dialectical theology. 
